Amy Mullin
In Nietzsche's Dancers: Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, and the Revaluation of Christian Values, Kimerer Lamothe achieves two goals: she gives us a long overdue serious examination of the many passages in Friedrich Nietzsche's works that make reference to dance and she provides an extended investigation of the texts and dances of Isadora Duncan and Martha Graham, female dance pioneers who were both influenced by Nietzsche and also sought to transform his philosophy. Lamothe is aware of the irony of Nietzsche's philosophy being taken up by dancing women, members of a sex whose creativity he often reduced to the capacity for bodily pregnancy. However, she does little to explore the misogyny in Nietzsche or responses to it from the dance pioneers who took up his philosophical legacy. She observes in a footnote that another theorist (Deborah Jowitt) "notes how Duncan 'cheerfully ignored' Nietzsche's opinion of women" (243) and echoes Duncan in not making Nietzsche's remarks on women a focus of her own work.
Nietzsche's Dancers is divided into three parts of roughly equal length. Part 1 discusses Nietzsche, part 2 discusses Duncan, and part 3 discusses Graham. The first two parts fit very well together. Duncan was very much influenced by Nietzsche, and Lamothe makes a convincing case for Duncan sharing with Nietzsche an interest in rejecting ascetic approaches to the body, and using dance to celebrate the body without viewing body and soul as distinct. Although Graham shared Nietzsche and Duncan's interest in "the affirmation of life," the third part is less directly related to the themes the first two parts explore. While Graham clearly did have an interest in Nietzsche, Lamothe is often interpreting passages from Graham's notebooks, and these notebooks were not extended explorations of particular themes. The third part will be a larger draw for those with direct interest in Graham's pioneering work in dance, and of somewhat lesser interest to those whose primary interest in the book is philosophical.
Lamothe gives detailed and thoughtful analyses of the many passages in Nietzsche that refer to dance from his earliest to his latest writings. She proceeds historically, starting with his references to the dancing of the chorus in Attic tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy and his use of dance as an analogy to the kind of freedom of spirit he values in Human All Too Human. Her second chapter focuses on Nietzsche's account of both free spirits and Zarathustra as dancers (in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra), and the third chapter concentrates on his opposition between dance and the ascetic ideal in his later writings (especially Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and Ecce Homo). She discusses his insistence that "thinking wants to be learned like dancing, as a kind of dancing" (6), describes free spirits dancing near abysses, explores his account of Zarathustra as a dancer, his discussion of the rope dancer who falls and eventually dies, his exaltation at dancing with Life, and documents the many times he draws upon images of dance to express his highest ideals. Dancing, she suggests, expresses both creativity and bodily becoming. While it requires discipline, and hence shares this with asceticism, it celebrates rather than denigrating or denying the importance of bodily being.
Lamothe devotes the next two chapters to exploring Duncan, by attending to her writings (Art of the Dance, Isadora Speaks, and My Life) along with her dancing. Although, as I mentioned earlier, Lamothe does not devote much discussion to Nietzsche's misogyny, she is clear that Duncan did not share it, and was interested in female bodily expression as creative and affirming. Her account of Duncan's efforts to start schools for children in a way that respected their bodily individuality while encouraging them to develop dancing skills is a fascinating aspect of her analysis of Duncan's writings, teaching, and dancing. Duncan wrote: "When I have taken children into my schools my aim has been above all else to bring them in to a consciousness of this power within themselves, of their relationship to the universal rhythm, to evoke from them the ecstasy, the beauty of this realization" (130). This part of Lamothe's book is valuable for taking seriously the way Duncan's philosophical beliefs and dance innovations were intertwined.
The third part gives a fascinating analysis of Graham's innovations in dance, but I found the philosophical aspects of Graham's work, and Lamothe's discussion of it, less persuasive. Lamothe tells us that Graham believed there would be "no dance without word-use; no word-use without symbolic bodily movement" and yet the argument for this universal claim was lacking. Similarly, Lamothe tells us that Graham's dance teaches us that "with every breath we recreate ourselves" (225). While there was an argument presented for this claim, it did not seem to bear enough weight if such recreation of the self is supposed to be much more than simple change.
A central claim of the book is that for Nietzsche, Duncan, and Graham alike "dancing is a theopraxis-an activity in which people image, elevate, and sanctify their highest ideals, and thereby enact the process of becoming of self-overcoming that Nietzsche claims 'life' is." Dance is spoken of as a "vision for what religion can be and should be" (109). Lamothe makes frequent references to religion throughout the book-in the title of the book, in the titles of chapters-and yet she is not always entirely clear about what she means by religion or the religious impulse, even sometimes putting "religion" in scare quotes. For instance, in her discussion of Graham, Lamothe acknowledges that Graham used religious language as metaphors (176) and yet wants to maintain that Graham's work remains religious. Lamothe seems to view any rejection of asceticism as itself necessarily religious. Similarly, while I found her emphasis on the dominantly linguistic nature of Christian spirituality (xiii) interesting and provocative, it was sometimes difficult to know precisely what she was targeting in criticizing, with Nietzsche and Duncan, Christian morality and Christian religion. This is because emphasis on language as a means of spiritual expression and on disciplining the body do not seem unique to Christianity, nor sufficient to define it.
Lamothe's emphasis on expanding the media we use to express our creativity (whether we equate this with spirituality or not) is valuable, and yet one point of tension within the book is the celebration of dancing as either one among many means of bodily expression or the privileged means of bodily expression. Lamothe tends at times to interpret reading and writing as somehow less bodily than dance. She writes that Graham's dancing "enacts a conflicted and mutually enabling relationship between the bodily activities of reading and writing, on the one head and dancing, on the other" (154). I wasn't sure if the reference to "on the one head" was a typographical error, but certainly at several points Lamothe suggests that writing and reading are head oriented rather than bodily, while at other times recognizing that all we do is bodily. She sometimes claims that for Nietzsche "dancing alone among the arts animates the body" (27) and yet at other points claims that Nietzsche engages in "writing as an artistic bodily practice-as a kind of dancing" (55). I would have welcomed more extended exploration of this issue of the place of dancing either alongside or in opposition to reading and writing.
The conclusion of the book encourages us to see dance as a way-or perhaps the way-in which we can know ourselves as bodies and move in ways that express self-love. I found myself wondering whether other activities could not also serve this purpose-we may be aware of our bodies and create beauty by means of them through gardening, and we may discipline our bodies and move creatively in ways that express our self-love in some sports. While gardening and playing soccer could also be undertaken in ways that view the body solely as an instrument, so too could dance, as Lamothe clearly acknowledges. Therefore, I would have liked more of an account of whether dance was being presented as one way among others of achieving the goals Lamothe cares about, or whether a more privileged status was being claimed for it. While I was left wanting more at various points, what the book does achieve is considerable, both as Nietzsche scholarship, for its careful attention to dance imagery in Nietzsche's works, and as an investigation of the ways in which dance can be in pursuit of significant philosophical goals.
